Odysseus Perps

Perpetual futures for Elysium launchpad coins that have no Hyperliquid market.

Draft, 2026-11-07. The contracts are written but not deployed and not audited. Fees, limits and shares are proposals, not terms.

Abstract

Odysseus Perps offers long and short markets on launchpad coins from Elysium (chain 99901, gas token HYPE) that have no Hyperliquid market. Any coin that clears a public bar is listed for free. Prices come from the coin’s own Uniswap v4 pool, slowed so that one large buy cannot move the mark at once. A vault of wrapped HYPE (WHYPE) takes the other side of every position, and exposure is capped by pool depth and vault size. Trades pay 0.30% to open and 0.30% to close, and the fees are shared between the vault, the coin’s creator, its launchpad and a treasury.

1. Problem

Holders of an Elysium pad coin can only buy or sell it. They cannot short it, hedge it or use leverage. A Hyperliquid listing is out of reach:

The HIP-3 stake lasts 183 days and covers one deployer’s market set. HYPE was about $77.50 on 2026-11-07, and Hyperliquid’s terms were read on 2026-11-06. Almost no pad coin will ever post that stake. Odysseus replaces it with a public bar.

2. Design

2.1 Actors

The plan has no LPs. It fills the vault only with fees, including fees from a separate Odysseus coin. Those fees can still be sent in as WHYPE, and they raise the value of every share.

2.2 Markets

The LISTER role lists each coin with its Uniswap v4 pool and that pool’s PoolManager. Elysium has many PoolManagers, so each market names its own. LISTER also sets the pool depth in HYPE, a max leverage of 1x to 5x taken from the tiers in 2.10, the oracle step, the creator wallet and the pad wallet. KEEPER refreshes depth within the limits in 2.11.

The bar (holders, age, top wallets, locks, tax, contract checks) is checked off-chain by a public script. Only the depth caps and the leverage limit are enforced on chain. The plan reads as if the bar were a protocol rule. In the code it is a rule the lister follows, and anyone can rerun the script.

2.3 Oracle

SlowOracle reads the pool’s sqrtPriceX96 and keeps a stored mark, in HYPE per coin. Each update moves the mark toward spot by at most the “step”, a fixed fraction of the mark per second. The step counts seconds, not blocks, because Elysium blocks are about 100 ms apart. One update counts at most 300 seconds, and the step can be at most 0.1% per second. Only the keeper moves the mark: its pokeMark names the spot the bot saw and reverts when the pool sits more than 1% from it, so a sandwich around the keeper can only delay an update. Anyone can still poke, and OdysseusPerps reads the pool before every open, close and liquidation, but those readings only record the recent highs and lows; they never move the mark. The oracle assumes 18-decimal tokens.

Entries and exits use whichever of mark and spot is worse for the trader: a long enters at the higher price and exits at the lower, and a short does the opposite. Liquidations use the mark only. A push inside one block therefore cannot liquidate anyone or pay a trader more than the mark has moved. If the pool reports a price of 0, opens revert, and closes and liquidations use the last stored mark. The oracle also reads the pool’s active liquidity as a HYPE reserve at the current price. While that reserve is below 25% of the market’s declared depth (half the HYPE side of a full-range pool that deep), the mark does not move and opens revert. Closes and liquidations still work, at the frozen mark.

2.4 Vault

OdysseusVault is an ERC4626 vault over WHYPE. Trader losses, half of all fees and liquidation fees flow into it, and trader profits are paid out of it. totalAssets is its WHYPE balance, so unrealized trader PnL is not counted. Shares are locked for 24 hours after their holder’s last deposit, locked shares cannot be transferred, and a wallet can deposit only for itself.

The plan says “match first, vault second”. The contracts have no matching engine. Every position settles against the vault, so matching happens only in the accounts: what the vault pays one side, it collects from the other. Perps are a separate book, so opening a short removes no liquidity and sells no tokens.

2.5 Positions

A trader can hold one position per side in each market, with a size from 1x its margin up to margin times the market’s max leverage. A size below the margin is refused: the caps count size and the payout cap counts margin, so a 0.2x position could take far more from the vault than the caps allowed for. close closes the whole position. It works at any time, even when the protocol is paused or the market is inactive. Equity is margin plus PnL, minus funding and the borrow fee owed.

When the lister closes a market to new positions, a 7-day clock starts. After it, anyone can settle that market’s positions one by one, at what the trader’s own close would get at that moment, paid to the trader. A settle has no price limit and its caller picks the moment, so on a healthy pool it waits: it reverts while the pool price, or the trader’s side of its last 10 to 20 minutes, is more than 2% from the mark as it stood before the call. Someone who pushes the price can shade a settle by at most that 2%; a bigger push only delays it. A pool that reads thin (its locked liquidity pulled, or its price out of the lock’s range) cannot be settled by just anyone, since a price can be pushed out of range inside one transaction; the lister, a multisig, settles those positions at the worst-of rule, with a limit price it checked against the pool, so a dead coin’s positions settle at what its pool says and nobody else can move that number. A delisted coin, or one whose pool was pulled and whose price froze, cannot hold the vault’s limits for good.

2.6 Fees

The fee is 0.30% of size to open, taken from the margin, and 0.30% of size to close. While a position is open it also pays a borrow fee of 0.005% of its size an hour (0.12% a day), long and short alike, which stays with the vault. Without it, a matched long and short could hold the vault’s global limit for free and block every market.

Traders of these coins already pay 2% to get in and out. Odysseus sits well under that and still earns more than big-coin venues, which it needs because thin coins put the vault at real risk. At 3x, the round trip is 1.8% of the trader’s own money, plus 0.36% of it for each day held. Bounce charges 2% a year while you hold; Odysseus charges more, because these coins move more. Hyperliquid’s 0.045% a side is from memory and must be confirmed before it is printed.

The plan pays these shares in HYPE. The contracts pay them in WHYPE. The vault’s half is sent at once, and the other shares wait in OdysseusPerps until each recipient calls claim. A coin falling under heavy shorting still pays its creator 20% of every fee.

2.7 Funding

The heavier side pays the lighter side. The rate is the market’s hourly rate times the long/short skew. It defaults to 0.1% an hour at full skew, and LISTER can set it as high as 1%. Both sides use the same rate per unit, so the vault keeps the difference. Funding builds up through a per-market index and is settled into equity at close or liquidation. The plan says funding pulls the perp toward the pool price. Here the perp has no price of its own, so funding pulls open interest toward balance instead.

2.8 Liquidation

Anyone can liquidate a position whose equity at the mark is below 2% of its size. The loss goes to the vault, along with a fee of 1% of size. Any equity left after that goes to the trader. The caller gets no reward, so liquidations depend on the operator’s keeper. A market delisted for 7 days can also be settled by anyone (2.5).

2.9 Caps

The caps are checked when a position opens; a trade that narrows the net gap always passes the net cap. At the $60,000 floor, a market holds at most $15,000 per side and $3,000 net. LP withdrawals afterwards can leave the total above 25% of a smaller vault; new positions that would raise it are then refused. Matched longs and shorts count at their larger side and pay the borrow fee, so holding the limit costs money every hour, and a market used to block it can be delisted and settled a week later.

The plan’s vault target is about $120k, which covers all ten coins in the tier table at these limits. A coin doing $500k a day with a 2% tax takes 12 days to fund that, if it holds its volume. At $120k, the 10% limit ($12,000) is tighter than 5% of depth only for coins deeper than $240k.

2.10 Listing bar and leverage tiers

Leverage on a thin pool is dangerous for one reason: moving the price is cheap, and the payout is big. Every rule below shrinks that gap. A coin must clear all of these.

The $6,700 figure matches a full-range pool whose two sides together are worth $60,000. Depth is stored in HYPE, so the dollar bar shifts as HYPE moves.

“Today” comes from the Styxn API on 2026-11-07 and covers the largest coins sampled, not the whole chain. Only the numbers were checked. Wallet shares, liquidity locks and contracts were not, so a listed coin could still fail.

Shorts get hit harder than longs, because these coins jump faster than they fall. That is why the starting limit is 3x, even though Shortcap offers 5x, and why the plan tells traders “up to 3x”. The contract’s hard cap is 5x, for the top tier only. These limits rest on 1,805 hourly candles from 15 of the largest Elysium coins (Styxn API, 2026-11-07), with each coin’s first day left out. Each move was measured from the hour’s open to its high or low, and a position counted as wiped at a move of 1 ÷ leverage.

2.11 Roles

3. Risk

3.1 Thin pools

Moving a thin pool is cheap. The push-cost numbers assume liquidity spread evenly across prices, and concentrated pools cost less to push. The bar doesn’t make an attack unprofitable. It limits what one attack can take, so the slow price feed and the 10% vault limit still have to be tested.

3.2 Oracle manipulation

Worse-of pricing stops one-block pushes. It does not stop an attacker who can hold a price:

• One update. After 300 idle seconds, the keeper’s next poke can move the mark by the step times 300: 3% at 0.01% a second, or 30% at the ceiling, toward a spot within 1% of what the keeper saw. The step has to stay low, and the keeper has to poke often.
• Stepped attack. Until the eleventh review, anyone could push the pool, poke and push back in every block and walk the mark at the full step for gas, enough to liquidate a healthy 5x position in about half an hour. Only the keeper moves the mark now, so the walk needs the keeper’s key, which the pauser can revoke at once. It is simulated in the tests.
• Keeper liveness. If the keeper stops, the mark freezes. Traders can still close at the worst of mark, spot and the recent extremes, under their own price limit; liquidations wait. A second keeper key is the backup.
• Lag. Liquidation uses the mark only, so in a fast real move a position can lose more than its margin first. When the other side is paid in full, the vault absorbs the gap.
• Pulled liquidity. In Uniswap v4, removing liquidity leaves the price where it was, and an empty range lets a small swap move it far. The zero-price fallback misses this. The liquidity floor catches it: once the active HYPE reserve drops under 25% of depth, the mark freezes and opens stop. Removing liquidity just above the floor is still possible, so the off-chain lock check stays in the bar.
• Stale depth. If a pool drains, depth can only halve once an hour. LISTER can deactivate the market sooner.

3.3 Vault insolvency

A position’s equity is capped at 5x its margin, so one winner can take at most 4x its margin in profit from the vault, whatever the coin does. Without that cap, a 50 HYPE long on a coin that goes 10x would pull about 450 HYPE from a 1,000 HYPE vault. A profit payout is also capped at what the vault holds when the position closes. The first winners to close are paid in full, and later ones get what is left. The plan answers “Will I actually get paid?” with the caps, but the code does not guarantee payment. Three things widen the risk:

• totalAssets ignores unrealized PnL, so an LP who expects a big payout can leave after the 24-hour lock and pass the loss to the LPs who stay.
• Caps are checked only at open, so later withdrawals can shrink the vault below them.
• The vault rules are the author’s judgment and have not been simulated.

3.4 Shorts visibility

A big short is a story on the timeline, and it can scare buyers. Liquidated shorts don’t buy spot, so the squeeze traders expect won’t hit the pool directly. Do not promise one.

3.5 Survivorship bias in the candle data

These coins all survived to become large, so real risk may be higher. The sample also leaves out first days, and 1,805 candles across 15 coins is about five days per coin.

3.6 Code and keys

Nothing is audited, and every coin must use 18 decimals. LISTER and KEEPER are trusted: a bad listing or a wrong depth loosens the caps.

4. Competitors

Odysseus cannot claim to be first.

What sets Odysseus apart is an open door: every pad’s coins, a bar anyone can read, and fees shared with the pad and the project. As far as their posts show, none of them offers all three. These claims come from the products’ own posts. None of the products has been tested.

5. Before mainnet

Status: SPEC and CODE were written together in one session at the author’s request, and both are in review. Nothing is deployed or audited. The plan holds everything until these checks are done:

The contracts add these steps:

• Deep invariant runs, a fork test against a real Elysium pool, the stepped attack (simulated since the eleventh review), the listing-bar script and the keeper bot.
• DEFAULT_ADMIN moved to a TimelockController.
• The bar rerun after Elysium’s public mainnet on 2026-11-09, and Hyperliquid’s fees confirmed.
• Launch with three coins, not thirty. EACCAT, BLOB and CHAMELEON are the deepest today, if they clear the wallet and contract checks. A short list reads as a standard and protects the vault.

6. Disclaimer

Coin data comes from the Styxn API on 2026-11-07, before Elysium’s public mainnet on 2026-11-09, so it will change. HIP-1 and HIP-3 costs come from Hyperliquid’s terms as read on 2026-11-06. Rival claims come from their own posts, and the author has not tested their products. Fees, limits and shares are proposals, not terms. The contracts are written but not deployed or audited. Not financial or legal advice.